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A TRIBUTE TO JUSTICE THOMAS B. MILLER
ANciL

G. RAMEY*

Tihe genius of the court-created common law is its evolutionary ability
'to grow with and adapt to changing conditions of society."

The long and distinguished judicial career of Justice Thomas B.
Miller of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, which began on January 1, 1977, recently concluded with his retirement on
August 30, 1994. During his tenure, Justice Miller was, by far, the
most prolific justice on the Supreme Court of Appeals.' Justice
* A.B., 1979, Marshall University; M.BA, 1983, West Virginia University; J.D.,
1983, West Virginia University; Clerk, Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
1. Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 884 n.14 (W. Va. 1979)
(quoting Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 675 (W. Va. 1979)).
2. During Justice Miller's tenure, the Supreme Court of Appeals issued 3,936 published opinions, including unsigned per curiam opinions. Of this number, in addition to supervising the preparation of hundreds of per curiam opinions, Justice Miller authored a total
of 671 published opinions. The only other justice to serve on the Supreme Court of Appeals
during Justice Miller's entire judicial career, Justice Richard Neely, was its next most prolific, authoring 520 published opinions. At least a dozen of Justice Miller's opinions have been
chosen as lead cases by the editors of the American Law Reports: Bettinger v. Bettinger,
400 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 1990), in David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Divorce and Separation:
Award of Interest on DeferredInstallment Payments of Marital Asset Distribution,10 A.L.R.
5TH 191 (1993); Stemple v. Dobson, 400 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 1990), in Frank J. Wozniak,
Annotation, Construction and Effect of Provision in Contract for Sale of Realty by Which
PurchaserAgrees to Take Property "As Is" or in Its Existing Condition, 8 A.L.R. 5TH 312
(1992); Price v. Halstead, 355 S.E.2d 380 (W. Va. 1987), in Gregory G. Samo, Annotation,
Passenger'sLiability to Vehicular Accident Victim for Harm Caused by Intoxicated Motor
Vehicle Driver, 64 A.L.R. 4TH 272 (1988); Bryant v. Willison Real Estate Co., 350 S.E.2d
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Miller's contributions, however, to West Virginia jurisprudence may
not be measured solely in statistical terms. He has often said the primary reason he sought election to the Supreme Court of Appeals was
his frustration, as an appellate lawyer, with its reluctance to hear cases
involving novel questions Without addressing complex legal issues,

many of which were the product of rapidly changing social, cultural,
political, and economic conditions, Justice Miller firmly believed that

West Virginia's jurisprudence was in jeopardy of stagnating, of growing more anachronistic.' Ultimately, Justice Miller was convinced that,

748 (W. Va. 1986), in Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Risk of Loss by Casualty Pending
Contract for Conveyance of Real Property-Modern Cases, 85 A.L.R. 4TH 233 (1991);
Whitehair v. Highland Memorial Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438 (W. Va. 1985), in John D.
Hodson, Annotation, Dead Bodies: Liabilityfor Improper Manner of Reinterment, 53 A.L.R.
47H 394 (1987); LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1983), in Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Divorce:Equitable DistributionDoctrine, 41 A.L.R. 4TH 481 (1985); Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1982), in Annotation, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a
Distinct Element or Factor in Awarding Damages for Bodily Injury, 34 A.L.R. 4TH 293
(1984); In re Estate of Tuebert, 298 S.E.2d 456 (W. Va. 1982), in Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Requirement That Holographic Will, or its Material Provisions, be Entirely in
Testator'sHandwriting as Affected by Appearance of Some Printed or Written MatterNot in
Testator'sHandwriting, 37 A.L.R. 4TH 528 (1985); State ex rel. Walker v. Giardina, 294
S.E.2d 900 (W. Va. 1982), in Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, Contempt Based on Violation of Court Order Where Another Court Has Issued Contrary Order, 36 A.L.R. 4TH 978
(1985); State v. Beck, 286 S.E.2d 234 (W. Va. 1981), in Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation,
Modern Status of Rude RegardingNecessity for Corroborationof Victim's Testimony in Prosecution for Sexual Offense, 31 A.L.R. 4TH 120 (1984); State ex rel. McMannis v. Mohn,
254 S.E.2d 805 (W. Va. 1979), in Michelle Migdal Gee, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Witness Testiffl'ng While in Prison Attire, 16 A.L.R. 4TH 1356 (1982);
Murredu v. Murredu, 236 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va. 1977), in Annotation, Propriety of Decree in
ProceedingBetween Divorced Parents to Determine Mother's Duty to Pay Support for Children in Custody of Father, 98 A.L.R. 3D 1146 (1980).
3. West Virginia and New Hampshire are the only two states in which the
jurisdiction of the appellate court of last resort is entirely discretionary. Theoretically, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia could refuse to grant review in any of the
cases presented and, accordingly, issue no decisions with any precedential value. Over the
decade prior to Justice Miller's arrival, the Supreme Court of Appeals issued 788 published
decisions, or about 79 per year. Over the decade after Justice Miller's arrival, the Supreme
Court of Appeals issued 2,253 published opinions, or about 225 per year.
4. In this regard, one commentator observed, "Between 1945 and 1975, the court
ranked among the least active and least progressive state supreme courts in the nation."
Hagan, Policy Activism in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, 1930-1985, 89 W.
VA. L. REV. 149, 149 (1986) (citing Canon & Baum, Patterns of Tort Law Innovations: An
Application of Diffusion Theory to JudicialDoctrines, 75 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 975 (1981);
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in an almost Darwinian sense, if the organic body of West Virginia
law did not adapt to its changing environment, the inevitable erosion in
public confidence could result in its effective extinction.5
Fortunately, for Justice Miller, his ascension to the appellate bench
coincided with the election of Justice Sam Harshbarger and Justice
Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., who in many respects shared his vision of a
more active Supreme Court of Appeals. 6 These three justices, together
with Justice Richard Neely, who came to the court in 1973, and Justice
Thomas E. McHugh, who came to the court in 1981, were much more
willing than their predecessors to hear and decide cases involving novel
or controversial issues. Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States,
the position of Chief Justice is rotated among the members of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia on an annual basis. Consequently, convenient labels like the Warren Court, the Burger Court,
or the Rehnquist Court cannot be applied to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia. In many respects, however, it would likely
not cause offense to Justice Miller's colleagues, who frequently acknowledged his role as their spiritual and intellectual leader,7 to refer

Baum & Cannon, State Supreme Courts as Activists: New Doctrinesin the Law of Torts, in
STATE SUPR mE CouRTs: POLiCYMAKERS IN TiE FEDmAL SYSTEM 83 (1982)).
5. In report of an August, 1994, interview, the author, quoting Justice Miller,
described the reputation of the Supreme Court of Appeals immediately prior to his election
as follows: "Circuit judges seated throughout the state didn't pay much attention to the weak
court. 'Judges would tell you all the time, when you cited law, "That might be the law of
the Supreme Court, but it's not the law here,"' - an utterance that put Miller, scrupulous
in matters of law, into deep distress." Martz, Justice Leaves Legacy of Benchmark Decisions,
CHARLESTON GAZETiE, Aug. 7, 1994, at 1B, col. 5.
6. This transformation of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was
chronicled by Hagan in Policy Activism in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
1930-1985, supra note 4.
7. In fact, in a rare act for an appellate judge, the late Justice Sam Harshbarger, in
his landmark opinion in Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 861 n.1 (W. Va. 1979), holding
that the "thorough and efficient" clause of W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1 mandates the
legislature to develop a high quality public education system, stated, "[t]he writer
acknowledges the valuable contributions by his Brother, Thomas B. Miller, especially in the
discussions about procedure . . . about equal protection . . . and issues for development
upon remand. . . ." In addition, Justice Franklin D. Cleckley, considered by many to be
West Virginia's finest legal scholar and teacher, who was appointed to succeed Justice
Miller, has referred to him as "the greatest justice in the history of West Virginia," Martz,
supra note 5, at IB, col. 1, and dedicated the third edition of his HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 4

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:553

to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia during his tenure as
the Miller Court.
Justice Miller was tenacious in his approach to judicial decisionmaking. During his first term, the Supreme Court of Appeals was
frequently criticized for its "activism." 8 Despite whatever obstacles that
may have arisen, however, Justice Miller remained firmly resolved to
fulfill his obligation to ensure the constant evolution of the law. No
matter how heroic one's efforts, perfection of the common law is forever elusive. Its very strength, its ability, in the words of Roscoe
Pound, to "combine[] certainty and a power of growth as no other
doctrine has been able to do,"9 can also be the source of its greatest
frustration. One of Justice Miller's finest achievements was his ability
to sustain, without regard to the political consequences, the constant
struggle to articulate a more precise expression of the law to meet the
demands of contemporary society, hoping that his efforts might not
only serve the needs of the present, but also provide guidance for the
future evolution of the law. It is extremely fitting, therefore, to pause
for reflection upon the career of one of the finest jurists in West
Virginia's history.
The remainder of this Article will be devoted to a chronological
analysis of a few of Justice Miller's most prominent opinions. His
dedication to the advancement of the law is obviously reflected in
more opinions than may possibly be discussed in this abbreviated format. The decisions in this Article, however, have been selected as
representative of Justice Miller's rich legacy, a series of landmark cases
that will provide invaluable guidance to courts for years to come.
FOR WEST VIRG]nIA LAWYERS (1994) to Justice Miller, stating, "[h]e brought West
Virginia's jurisprudence into the twentieth century."

8. For example, one newspaper editorial writer complained:
"West Virginia's activist Supreme Court kept trying to mold state government in
its own image in 1983. The court issued decisions making or reinterpreting law
across a wide expanse of public issues-social welfare, education, criminal law,
women's rights, consumerism, and relations between state government's judicial,
legislative and executive branches."
Little, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Jan. 1, 1984, at 1B, col. 5, quoted in Hagan, supra note 4,

at 149.
9. PouND, TiE SPmrr OF TBE COMMON LAW 182 (1921), quoted in Morningstar,
253 S.E.2d at 675.
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One of Justice Miller's first opinions," North v. West Virginia
Board of Regents," was a dramatic display of his scholarly approach
to judicial decision-making. Its analytical framework would be repeated
in dozens of subsequent opinions. The narrow issue in North was
whether the due process rights of a fourth-year medical student had
been violated in the course of his expulsion for misrepresentations on
his entrance application." After acknowledging that university attendance was traditionally viewed as a matter of privilege, Justice Miller
noted that the Supreme Court of the United States, in Goss v.
Lopez, 3 had recently recognized that public school students have liberty and property interests which afford certain due process rights. The
reasoning in Goss, Justice Miller concluded, "applies with equal force
to a student at a state-supported university."14
In determining the nature of the procedural rights to be afforded to
North, Justice Miller explored the variety of interests which the United
States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia had recognized as deserving due process protection." He noted that as early as 1943, in State ex rel. Rogers v. Board of Education, 6 the Supreme Court of Appeals had recognized that certain procedural protections should have been afforded to a county school superintendent who was removed from office. After an exhaustive analysis of relevant precedent, Justice Miller concluded in Syllabus Point 2
of North:

Inhere are certain fundamental principles in regard to procedural due
process embodied in Article m1I, Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution, which are; First, the more valuable the right sought to be deprived,
the more safeguards will be interposed. Second, due process must general-

ly be given before the deprivation occurs unless a compelling public policy dictates otherwise. Third, a temporary deprivation of rights may not

10. This opinion was filed on March 29, 1977, less than three months after Justice

Miller began his tenure on the Supreme Court of Appeals.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977).
North, 233 S.E.2d at 413.
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
North, 233 S.E.2d at 415.
Id. at 415-16.
25 S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. 1943).
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require as large a measure
of procedural due process protection as a per17
manent deprivation.

With respect to the precise nature of the protections to be afforded a

university student upon expulsion, Justice Miller held in Syllabus Point
3 of North that "a formal written notice of charges; sufficient opportunity to prepare to rebut the charges; opportunity to have retained counsel at any hearings on the charges, to confront his accusers, and to
present evidence on his own behalf; an unbiased hearing tribunal; and
an adequate record of the proceedings" were required."

In addition to its expansion of the availability of procedural due
process protections, Justice Miller's opinion in North is notable in other

respects. As previously noted, the methodology employed became a
hallmark of Justice Miller's opinions. Although he carefully scrutinized
both federal and state constitutional provisions, Justice Miller ultimately
grounded his opinion on the West Virginia Constitution. 9 In addition,

17. North, 233 S.E.2d at 413, Syl. Pt. 2.
18. Id. at 413, Syl. Pt. 3.
19. See, e.g., North, 233 S.E.2d at 413, Syl. Pts. 1-2. Later, in The New Federalism
in West Virginia, 90 W. VA. L. RE-V. 51, 59-64 (1987), Justice Miller discussed the existing
line of cases in which the Supreme Court of Appeals interpreted the state constitution as
affording greater individual rights than under the federal constitution. Justice Miller concluded his review by remarking: "These cases demonstrate a willingness to establish an independent state constitutional basis where the constitutional language suggests an enhanced
right. . . . I believe that our state constitutional jurisprudence will continue to grow. This is
particularly so in matters of strong state or local interest." Id. at 64-65. In this regard, one
legal scholar has observed, "[tihe rulings of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
which construe the provisions of the state constitution . . . have special significance not
only in the lives of West Virginians but in the development of a national constitutional
jurisprudence." Nichol, Dialectical Federalism: A Tribute to the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 91, 92 (1987). During his judicial career, Justice
Miller authored many of the most significant West Virginia opinions involving constitutional
issues. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Caperton, 441 S.E.2d 373 (W. Va. 1994)
(affiming the governor's refusal to restore budget cuts after end of fiscal year); State ex
rel. Frail v. $24,900.00,. 453 S.E.2d 307 (W. Va. 1994) (imposing procedural due process
protections in contraband forfeiture cases); State ex rel. Holmes v. Gainer, 447 S.E.2d 887
(W. Va. 1994) (upholding the constitutionality of a legislative pay raise); State ex rel. Lawrence v. Polan, 453 S.E.2d 612 (W. Va. 1994) (invalidating scheme for issuance of revenue
bonds); State ex rel. Robb v. Caperton, 446 S.E.2d 714 (W. Va. 1994) (sustaining the constitutionality of a procedure for filling judicial vacancies); Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549
(W. Va. 1993) (reconciling the right to petition with the law of defamation); State ex rel.
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despite meticulously analyzing relevant United States Supreme Court
precedent, Justice Miller analogized those precedents to previous decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeals.2" Further, Justice Miller combined his legal analysis with a recognition of changing social conditions, noting that the development of the law regarding the procedural
due process rights of students was "largely attributed to politically
active students, particularly those involved in the civil rights movement, whose activities resulted in the unrest manifested on many college campuses during the 1960's. '21 Finally, the opinion was carefully
crafted, on the one hand, to provide specific guidance to the trial court
upon remand,22 but also, on the other hand, to implicitly challenge

Marockie v. Wagoner, 438 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1993) (invalidating scheme to liquidate
school building authority bonds with dedicated consumer sales tax); Boley v. Miller, 418
S.E.2d 352 (W. Va. 1992) (upholding statute providing state funding for abortions); State ex
tel. Cravotta v. Hechler, 421 S.E.2d 698 (W. Va. 1992) (directing ballot access after party's
candidate permitted to withdraw); Lilly v. Duke, 376 S.E.2d 122 (W. Va. 1989) (invalidating property tax forfeiture statute); State ex reL Hudok v. Henry, 389 S.E.2d 188 (W. Va.
1989) (recognizing qualified reporter's privilege); Committee on Legal Ethics of the West
Virginia State Bar v. Douglas, 370 S.E.2d 325 (W. Va. 1988) (finding limited first amendment protection for a lawyer's criticism of judges); State ex rel. Walton v. Casey, 370
S.E.2d 141 (W. Va. 1988) (invalidating bill that did not include object in title); Daily Gazette Co. v. West Virginia Bd. of Medicine, 352 S.E.2d 66 (W. Va. 1986) (opening physician disciplinary proceedings to public); City of Fairmont v. Pitrolo Pontiac-Cadillac Co.,
308 S.E.2d 527 (W. Va. 1983) (declaring municipal fire fee to be an unconstitutional ad
valorem tax); Hickson v. Kellison, 296 S.E.2d 855 (W. Va. 1982) (declaring jail conditions
violative of constitutional standards); Myers v. Barte, 279 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 1981) (invalidating freeholder requirement for membership on municipal planning commission); State ex
teL Bd. of Educ. v. Rockefeller, 281 S.E.2d 131 (W. Va. 1981) (invalidating gubernatorial
reduction in budget as violative of constitutionally preferential status of public education);
Hendershot v. Hendershot, 263 S.E.2d 90 (W. Va. 1980) (delineating procedural due process
protections in contempt proceedings); State ex. tel Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267 S.E.2d
544 (W. Va. 1980) (recognizing right of public access to criminal proceedings); West Virginia Libertarian Party v. Manchin, 270 S.E.2d 634 (W. Va. 1980) (invalidating as unconstitutional various restrictions on ballot access by third-party candidates); Markey v. Wachtel,
264 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1979) (finding no right to jury trial in involuntary commitment
proceedings); State ex iel. Bromelow v. Daniel, 258 S.E.2d 119 (W. Va. 1979) (invalidating
municipal ordinance restricting ballot access by requiring evidence of bondability); State ex
rel. Piccirillo v. City of Follansbee, 233 $.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1977) (invalidating statutory
restrictions on ballot access based upon payment of taxes).
20. North, 233 S.E.2d at 415-16.
21. Id. at 414.
22. Id. at 418-19.
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trial courts to interpret prior precedents more creatively in addressing

novel questions of law.'
Another of Justice Miller's early opinions, Harless v. First National Bank,24 is also one of his most *seminal.' It involved one of the
most entrenched common law principles, the doctrine of at-will em-

ployment. The plaintiff alleged that termination of his employment
with the defendant was the direct .result of his efforts to ensure his

employer's compliance with consumer credit and protection laws.26
The bank responded that, under the common law, his employment was
23. In addition to its citation of Rogers, the North opinion also cited Anderson v.
George, 233 S.E.2d 407 (W. Va. 1977) (seizure of animals); Persinger v. Edwin Assoc., 230
S.E.2d 460 (W. 'Va. 1976) (attachment); Beverlin v. Board of Educ. of Lewis County, 216
S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1975) (dismissal of a teacher); State ex rel. Payne v. Walden, 190
S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1972) (distress); State ex rel. Bowen v. Flowers, 184 S.E.2d 611 (W.
Va. 1971) (suspension from pharmaceutical program); State ex rel. Bronaugh v. Parkersburg,
136 S.E.2d 783 (W. Va. 1964) (denial of hospital privileges); and State ex rel. Ellis v.
Kelly, 112 S.E.2d 641 (W. Va. 1960) (revocation of used car dealer license).
24. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
25. The Harless opinion, further, is one of Justice Miller's most frequently cited
opinions. It has been cited, according to Shephard's, by the United States Courts of Appeal
for the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits; by United States District Courts in the First,
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits; and by state appellate courts in
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois,
Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. In addition to Harless, other
significant labor and employment law decisions authored by Justice Miller include Riesbeck
Food Mkts., Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local Union 23, 404 S.E.2d 404
(W. Va. 1991) (restricting the issuance of injunctions against picketing on private property
where unfair labor practices charge has been filed); P.G. & H. Coal Co. v. International
Union, United Mine Workers of America, 390 S.E.2d 551 (W. Va. 1990) (overturning order
finding union in contempt for acts of its members); Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 371
S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that retaliatory discharge action could be filed prior to
exhaustion of administrative remedies); Greyhound Lines-East v. Geiger, 366 S.E.2d 135 (W.
Va. 1988) (recognizing cause of action for perpetuation of past discrimination in collective
bargaining agreements); Liller v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 639 (W.
Va. 1988) (allowing subsequent civil rights action after filing civil service grievance); City
of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, and Dep't Store Union, 283 S.E.2d 589 (W. Va. 1980)
(holding peaceful strike by public employees does not give rise to cause of action by
employer for damages); and Hurley v. Allied Chem. Corp., 262 S.E.2d 757 (W. Va. 1980)
(recognizing cause of action for denial of employment on the basis of past receipt of mental
health services).
26. Harless, 246 S.E.2d at 272-73.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol97/iss3/4

8

Ramey: A Tribute to Justice Thomas B. Miller

1995]

A TRIBUTE TO JUSTICEMILLER

terminable at the will of either party, with or without cause.' Rather
than an extensive analysis of this accepted common law principle,
Justice Miller began by noting the recent erosion of the at-will doctrine. He observed' that in cases involving firings for jury service,29
exercising a statutory right as a stockholder to inspect corporate
books,3" complaining about unsafe products, 1 filing workers' compensation claims,32 refusing to undergo polygraph testing,33 refusing
to date a supervisor,34 asserting a right to earned commissions," refusing to testify falsely before a legislative committee,3" and applying
for union membership,37 courts had either applied or recognized the
existence of a cause of action for wrongful discharge in the at-will
context. Justice Miller further noted that the harshness of the at-will
doctrine had been under recent attack by a number of legal commentators.3 Accordingly, Justice Miller succinctly concluded, "the rule giving the employer the absolute right to discharge an at will employee
must be tempered by the further principle that where the employer's
motivation for the discharge contravenes some substantial public policy
principle, then the employer may be liable to the employee for damages occasioned by the discharge."39
In State ex rel. McLendon v. Morton,4" the potential for arbitrariness in administrative decisions regarding public employment was presented. In McLendon, a professor had been denied a hearing following
her employer's refusal to grant tenure.41 The college claimed, as in

27. Id. at 273.
28. Id. at 273-75.
29. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).

30. Campbell v. Ford Indus., 546 P.2d 141 (Or. 1976).
31. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
32. Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Frampton v.
Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
33. Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 573 P.2d 907 (Ariz. 1977).
34. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
35. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
36. Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959).
37. Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961).
38. Harless, 246 S.E.2d at 275 (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 275.
40. 249 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1978).
41. Id. at 920.
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North, that the professor had no constitutionally protected interest and,
therefore, no right to due process.42 Following a painstaking recitation
of the procedural history of the case, including the full text of the
relevant administrative regulations,43 Justice Miller prefaced his review
of United States Supreme Court precedent by noting, "while we may
utilize the teachings of the United States Supreme Court in its due
process cases, we are not constrained by identicality so long as we do
not diminish our State standard below the federal standard."44 He further observed at the conclusion of such review, that a "precise line
cannot be drawn around the concepts of property and liberty interest
since these terms expand with society's enlightened values."4
In deciding whether a constitutionally protected interest was present, Justice Miller noted that substantial regulations had been promulgated governing eligibility, evaluation, and decision on tenure.4" He
further noted the professor's six years of full-time employment in academic teaching, which met the only objective criterion for tenure consideration.47 Finally, he observed that the only subjective factor contained in the academic regulations, teaching competency, was not relied
upon in the denial of tenure.48 Rather, the letter informing the professor of the denial of tenure offered no reason for such decision.49
Based upon these circumstances, Justice Miller concluded that the professor had more than a unilateral expectation of tenure and, accordingly, she was entitled to certain procedural due process protections.5 "
In Morningstar v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., ' the question of whether a manufacturer was liable in tort in West Virginia to a

42. Id.

43. Id. at 921-22. This is another characteristic of Justice Miller's opinions, his
inclusion of the full text of the language being interpreted, carefully taking the reader
through the logical analysis applied in the interpretation of such language.
44. Id. at 922 (citation omitted).
45. Morton, 249 S.E.2d at 923.
46. Id. at 924-25.
47. Id. at 925.
48. Id.

49. Id. It is obvious from the tone of the remainder of Justice Miller's opinion that it
was this aspect of the case that he found most disturbing.
50. Morton, 249 S.E.2d at 925.
51. Morningstar,253 S.E.2d at 666.
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person injured

by

563

a defective product was presented.

Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.

53

2

Judge

had rejected

the common law principle that a cause of action could not be sustained
arising from injuries caused by a defective product unless the plaintiff
had privity of contract with the manufacturer. Later, in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.,54 the California Supreme Court expressly

52. In addition to Morningstar and Bradley, Justice Miller authored many of the
leading West Virginia opinions in the area of tort law during his tenure. See, e.g., Wehner
v. Weinstein, 444 S.E.2d 27 (W. Va. 1994) (rejecting consideration of personal consumption
in wrongful death cases); Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 2137 (1994) (holding loss of enjoyment of life not subject to economic
calculation); Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557 (W. Va. 1992) (finding successor
liability for punitive damages); Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1991)
(recognizing cause of action for emotional distress for son who witnessed mother's assault
by father); Torrence v. Kusmiusky, 408 S.E.2d 684 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that emergency
room personnel are agents of hospital regardless of contractual status); Anderson v. Moulder,
394 S.E.2d 61 (W. Va. 1990) (recognizing dram shop liability arising from sale to minor);
Board of Educ. of McDowell County v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 390 S.E.2d 796
(W. Va. 1990) (holding that good faith settlement extinguishes right of contribution among
joint tortfeasors); Bennett v. 3 C Coal Co., 379 S.E.2d 388 (W. Va. 1989) (permitting
damages for emotional distress caused by disturbance or desecration of relative's grave);
King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 387 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1989) (establishing doctrine of
comparative assumption of risk); Greyhound Lines-East v. Geiger, 366 S.E.2d 135 (W. Va.
1988) (recognizing cause of action for perpetuation of past discrimination in collective
bargaining agreements); Pack v. Van Meter, 354 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1986) (recognizing
cause of action for premises liability); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985)
(recognizing cause of action for wrongful pregnancy); Conley v. Spillers, 301 S.E.2d 216
(W. Va. 1983) (explaining doctrine of collateral estoppel); Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 289 S.E.2d 679 (W. Va. 1982) (applying retroactively abolition of the common law
rule of interspousal immunity); Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Prods., Inc., 288 S.E.2d 511 (W.
Va. 1982) (recognizing right of manufacturer in product liability case to file third-party
complaint against employer under an intentional tort theory); Bond v. City of Huntington,
276 S.E.2d 539 (W. Va. 1981) (permitting recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death
actions); Ratlief v. Yokum, 280 S.E.2d 584 (W. Va. 1981) (abolishing common law doctrine
of last clear chance); S.R. v. City of Fairmont, 280 S.E.2d 712 (W. Va. 1981) (finding that
a Pennsylvania abortion clinic had sufficient contacts with West Virginia to support the
exercise of jurisdiction in a malpractice action instituted by a West Virginia resident);
Kanawha Valley Bank v. Friend, 253 S.E.2d 528 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that presumption
of constructive fraud may arise in connection with joint bank accounts with a right of
survivorship if parties occupy fiduciary or confidential relationship); Coffindaffer v.
Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978) (abrogating common law defense of interspousal

immunity).
53. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
54.

377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963).
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rejected the requirement of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §
402A, that the product be "unreasonably dangerous." Black & Decker
argued, however, that before reaching these issues, the effect of W.
VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13, which provides that, "such parts of the
common law . . . as are in force on the effective date of this article . . . shall be and continue the law of this State until altered or
repealed by the legislature," must be decided.
Justice Miller noted the divergent line of cases in West Virginia
regarding the ability of the Supreme Court of Appeals to alter the
common law.5 Historically, however, the court had failed to consider
persuasive authority in other states with similar constitutional provisions. In fact, as Justice Miller noted,56 it was erroneously stated in
Seagraves v. Legg,57 that, "[a]pparently [other] states do not have the
same constitutional and statutory provisions as West Virginia ....
Justice Miller's research revealed an abundance of persuasive authority
in other states" for the proposition, as he stated in Syllabus Point 2
of Morningstar, that "Article VIII, Section 13 of the West Virginia
Constitution and W. Va. Code, 2-1-1, were not intended to operate as
a bar to this Court's evolution of common law principles, including its
historic power to alter or amend the common law." 9 In addition to
his careful review of judicial decisions in other states with similar
constitutional and statutory provisions, Justice Miller characteristically
supported his conclusions with a thoughtful analysis of the work of
prominent legal scholars.6"
After resolving the issue of whether its adoption would violate the
state constitution, the discussion of incorporation of the law of product
liability into West Virginia jurisprudence, though scholarly, was fairly
straightforward. The most interesting aspect of this discussion, however,
was Justice Miller's discovery of a 1902 West Virginia case, Peters v.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
Holmes,

Morningstar,253 S.E.2d at 670.
Id. at 671.
127 S.E.2d 605, 607 (W. Va. 1962).
Morningstar,253 S.E.2d at 671-76.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 675 (citing R. PouND, TEE Sprr OF THE COMMON Law 182 (1921);
The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897)).
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Johnson, Jackson & Co.,61 in which Judge Branson, fourteen years
62 articulated principrior to Judge Cardozo's decision in MacPherson,
ples that would eventually be accepted as the law of product liability
in a case where the plaintiff sought damages for injuries after ingesting
a drug he had not purchased.63 Justice Miller derived great pleasure in
tracing the historical antecedents of modem legal principles, particularly
if those antecedents were articulated in West Virginia cases. He had a
deep appreciation and natural affinity for the appellate judge's role in
weaving the threads of precedent, sometimes forgotten, into a cloth
fitting the needs of contemporary society.
In Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.,' the issue presented,
whether the traditional doctrine of contributory negligence should be
rejected in favor of the modem concept of comparative negligence, was
perfectly suited for Justice Miller. It afforded him yet another opportunity to shape West Virginia's rapidly changing common law. "[T]he
doctrine of contributory negligence," Justice Miller emphasized, "was
judicially created."65 Reiterating a theme from his earlier opinions,
Justice Miller stated, "[t]he history of the common law is one of gradual judicial development and adjustment of the case law to fit the
changing conditions of society."66 He then embarked on a thorough
analysis of the work of legal scholars, the activities of state legislatures, and the decisions of four states that had recently abolished the
doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of a "pure" comparative
negligence concept.67 Eventually, Justice Miller rejected the pure com61. 41 S.E. 190 (W. Va. 1902).
62. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1050.
63. Justice Miller further noted, in chronological order, previous decisions of the
Supreme Court of Appeals in Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 2 S.E.2d 898
(W. Va. 1939) (recognizing cause of action against chewing tobacco manufacturer despite no
privity of contract); Parr v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 3 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1939)
(applying doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to bottling company); Blevins v. Raleigh Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, 3 S.E.2d 627 (W. Va. 1939) (applying doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
bottling company); and Ferrell v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 109 S.E.2d 489 (W. Va. 1959)
(applying doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to bottling company), in support of the proposition
that principles of product liability, though not specifically incorporated, were an integral part
of the law of West Virginia. Morningstar,253 S.E.2d at 678-79.
64. 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
65. Id. at 881.

66. Id. at 884 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 882-83. Under "pure" comparative negligence, a party may recover,
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parative negligence approach in favor of the "fifty percent approach"68
that had been recently adopted by a number of state legislatures. He
expressed the view that, "[w]hile it can be conceded that there is an
obvious injustice in the current contributory negligence rule which bars
recovery no matter how slight the plaintiffs negligence, nevertheless
the pure comparative negligence rule seems equally extreme at the
other end of the spectrum."69 In addition to providing illustrative examples of the inherent problems of a pure comparative negligence rule,
Justice Miller noted, "in the field of tort law we are not willing to
abandon the concept that where a party substantially contributes to his
own damages, he should not be permitted to recover for any part of
,,
them. M
Although Justice Miller recognized the need for the evolution of
the common law, he further noted in Bradley that its development
historically has been "gradual," with an emphasis on the "adjustment"
of precedent to "fit the changing conditions of society. "71 Characteristically, Justice Miller expended as much effort in Bradley on the practical implications of the new rule and providing guidance regarding its
implementation as was expended on deciding the more narrow issue.
This pragmatic approach to advancing the common law where the
effects of change are uncertain is one of the hallmarks of Justice
Miller's philosophy of judicial decision-making.
In Jenkins v. J.. Penney Casualty Insurance Co.,7" the application of another Justice Miller opinion, Hurley v. Allied Chemical

regardless of whether his or her fault exceeded that of other tortfeasors, based solely on the
damages awarded, reduced by the percentage of his or her fault. For example, a party
ninety-nine percent at fault, suffering one million dollars in damages, would recover ten
thousand dollars from the other party, assuming no damages were suffered by the other
party, even though that party was only one percent at fault.
68. This approach provides that a plaintiff may recover only so long as his or her
negligence does not equal or exceed fifty percent. Bradley, 256 S.E.2d at 882-83. Later, in
King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 387 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1989), Justice Miller began referring to
this concept, more precisely, as "comparative contributory negligence."
69. Bradley, 256 S.E.2d at 883-84.
70. Id. at 885.
71. Id. at 884.
72. 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981).
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Corp.,73 which established the West Virginia test for determining
whether a statute gives rise to a private cause of action, was involved.74 In Jenkins, the statute at issue prohibited certain unfair insurance claim settlement practices.75 The insurer's chief defense was
that even if insureds had a private cause of action under the statute,
the plaintiff was a third party who claimed property damage as the
result of the negligence of the company's insured and, accordingly, was
not a member of the class protected by the statute.76 Justice Miller
noted, however, the broad language of the statute, which included
references not only to "insureds," but also to "claimants" and "beneficiaries."77 The insurer also argued that the existence of administrative
remedies under the statute was inconsistent with a private cause of
action. 78 Justice Miller rejected this argument, stating that, "the administrative remedy provides no direct relief for an injured person, but
only provides sanctions against the company or fines in favor of the
State. ' 79 Finally, Justice Miller concluded that "the legislative policy
encouraging prompt settlement of meritorious claims parallels our longstanding judicial policy that encourages compromise and settlement of
disputed claims,"" and that a private cause of action under the statute
did exist. Both the holding in Jenkins and, more importantly, its clear
statement of judicial policy favoring the prompt settlement of insurance
claims, have significantly influenced West Virginia law.

73. 262 S.E.2d 757 (W. Va. 1980).
74. Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 254. For other insurance law opinions authored by Justice
Miller, see Christian v. Sizemore, 383 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1989) (holding that declaratory
judgment to determine insurance coverage could be brought in original personal injury
action); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pitrolo, 342 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1986) (approving
attorney fees and costs against insurer for wrongful failure to defend); Hensley v. Erie Ins.
Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981) (concluding that public policy does not preclude
insurance coverage for punitive damages in appropriate circumstances); Staley v. Municipal
Mut. Ins. Co., 282 S.E.2d 56 (W. Va. 1981) (holding that failure of notice to include words
"cancelled" or "cancellation" rendered inadequate notice of cancellation of insurance policy).
75. Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 254.
76. Id. at 255.
77. Id. at 256.

78. Id. at 257.
79. Id. (footnote omitted).
80. Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 258.
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Fairness to women in the distribution of marital assets upon divorce was the issue presented in LaRue v. LaRue.8 Although the Supreme Court of Appeals had previously recognized the equitable powers of a divorce court with respect to the fair division of marital property,' it had never integrated its fragmentary rulings into a comprehensive legal theory. As noted by Justice Miller, the LaRue marriage
was "traditional," 3 with the wife serving the role of mother and
homemaker. Her fmancial contributions to the marriage, accordingly,

were minimal.84 Therefore, traditional contract or equitable principles,
such as fraud or constructive trust, were not easily applied.85 Addi-

tionally, homemaker services, as Justice Miller noted, were historically
regarded as "consideration for the husband's traditional obligation to
support his wife,"86 and, accordingly, "upon the dissolution of a marriage where she was not at fault, the wife is entitled to alimony."87
Repudiating the traditionally narrow approach to the distribution of

marital assets, Justice Miller's opinion in LaRue established three im81. 304 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1983). In addition to LaRue and Whiting, Justice Miller
wrote several other significant domestic relations cases. See, e.g., Alonzo v. Jacqueline F.,
445 S.E.2d 189 (W. Va. 1994) (establishing the right of adopted child to continued contact
with siblings); State ex reL Sullivan v. Watt, 419 S.E.2d 708 (W. Va. 1992) (outlining
procedure for circuit court review of family law master recommendations); Gangopadhyay v.
Gangopadhyay, 403 S.E.2d 712 (W. Va. 1991) (mandating procedural protections in
reviewing fairness of oral property settlement agreement in divorce proceeding); Butcher v.
Butcher, 357 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 1987) (holding military pension benefits subject to
equitable distribution).
82. Justice Miller noted in LaRue, that in Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709 (W.
Va. 1981), a constructive trust theory was used to secure a wife's interest in property to
which she had made a material economic contribution; in Marshall v. Marshall, 273 S.E.2d
360 (W. Va. 1981), the principle of fiduciary relationship was applied to property
transactions between husband and wife; in Dyer v. Tsapis, 249 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1978),
the contractual nature of marriage was referenced in regard to the modem concept of nofault divorce; and in Phillips v. Phillips, 144 S.E. 875 (W. Va. 1928), the term "equitable
division" was used with reference to property acquired during a marriage. La Rue, 304
S.E.2d at 318-20.
83. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d at 315.
84. Id.
85. In fact, the Supreme Court of Appeals had recently stated, "Traditional domestic
services . . .never alone give rise to grounds for impressing the property of the husband
with a trust." Patterson, 277 S.E.2d at 711, Syl. Pt. 3.
86. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d at 322.
87. Id. at 322.
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portant principles. First, LaRue expressly incorporated the "doctrine of
equitable distribution" into West Virginia jurisprudence, holding that "a
spouse, who has made a material economic contribution toward the
acquisition of property which is titled in the name of or under the
control of the other spouse" has a "claim [to] an equitable interest in
such property in a proceeding seeking a divorce."88 Second, LaRue
rejected the concept of "fault" as having any relevancy in the distribution of marital assets, holding that "because these are economic contributions, the right to claim such equitable relief is not barred because
the party seeking them may be found at fault in the divorce action."89
Finally, overruling the recently decided Patterson," the opinion in
LaRue held that homemaker services should be considered in the equitable distribution of marital assets upon a divorce.91 Of course, much
has changed since LaRue, with the codification and evolution of the
fundamental principles it established. It is clearly, however, a watershed decision in the law of divorce in West Virginia.
The issue of free speech rights for government employees was
presented in Orr v. Crowder.93 The plaintiff, a college librarian, alleged, inter alia, that she had been fired94 for criticizing a plan to
remodel the library.95 In Pickering v. Board of Education,96 the United States Supreme Court had recognized that public employees have
free speech rights that may be violated by adverse personnel decisions
based upon the exercise of such rights. College officials, however,
argued that the plaintiff had not met her burden under Mt. Healthy
City Board of Education v. Doyle' to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that her criticism of the remodeling plans was a substan-

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
given a

Id. at 320.
Id. at 320-21.
Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709 (W. Va. 1981).
LaRue, 304 S.E.2d at 322.
See W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2-1 to -36 (1994).
315 S.E.2d 593 (W. Va. 1983).
In the strictest sense, the plaintiff's employment was not "terminated," but she was
"terminal contract" that would eventually result in her loss of employment. Id. at

598.
95. Id. at 601.

96. 391 U.S. 563 (1969).
97. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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tial or motivating factor in her termination. Rejecting a narrow application of the Mt. Healthy test, Justice Miller noted that prior to her
criticism of their remodeling plans, the plaintiff had a good working
relationship with her superiors, who had never expressed any dissatisfaction with her job performance." In fact, the plaintiff had gradually been given more responsibilities in apparent recognition of her competency.99 Conversely, after the plaintiffs criticism, she was confronted by an angry supervisor about her comments during a faculty meeting at which the remodeling plans were discussed, and subjected to a
verbal attack by another supervisor at a subsequent meeting.1"' Justice
Miller noted that several courts had affirmed verdicts in similar cases
based upon circumstantial evidence, and held, as a general proposition,
that in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a
jury verdict, a court should:
(1) consider the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party; (2) assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved by the jury in favor
of the prevailing party; (3) assume as proved all facts which the prevailing
party's evidence tends to prove; and (4) give to the prevailing party the
benefit of all favorable inferences which may reasonably be drawn from
the facts proved.''

98. Orr, 315 S.E.2d at 602-03.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 604.
101. Id. at 606. In addition to this clear articulation of the general rule on the
sufficiency of evidence to support a verdict in a civil case, another major holding in Orr
was necessitated in light of Justice Miller's conclusion that the plaintiff's procedural due
process rights were not violated in connection with the denial of her application for tenure,
another theory of recovery submitted to the jury upon which it presumably could have based
its verdict. Relying on authority in other jurisdictions, Justice Miller's opinion established,
for the first time in a West Virginia case, that:
[W]here a jury returns a general verdict in a case involving two or more
liability issues and its verdict is supported by the evidence on at least
one issue, the verdict will not be reversed, unless the defendant has
requested and been refused the right to have the jury make special
findings as to his liability on each of the issues.
Id. at 608.
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In another opinion by Justice Miller, Israel v. West Virginia Secondary Schools Activities Commission,1" the issue of gender discrimination in access to interscholastic athletics was presented. The plaintiff,
who had played baseball competively with boys her age for almost a
decade, challenged an administrative regulation which denied her the
opportunity to play on her high school baseball team because her high
school had a girls' softball team." 3 Justice Miller acknowledged that,
"courts have recognized that it is constitutionally permissible under
certain circumstances for public schools to maintain separate sports
teams for males and females so long as they are substantially equivalent," 1 but further observed, "this does not mean that mere superficial equivalency will be found constitutional under equal protection
principles." ' With no precedent to be found, Justice Miller scrutinized the games of baseball and softball, the differences in the size of
the ball, the manner of delivery to the plate, the number of players in
the field, the dimensions of the infield, the elevation of the mound, the
length of the bat, and the pace of the play, and concluded that, for
purposes
of equal protection analysis, they were not substantially equiv10 6
alent.
Having determined the existence of a equal protection violation in
Israel, the nature of available remedies remained for decision. The
agency responsible for the regulation of interscholastic athletics argued
that it was not a "place of public accommodations" under the state
human rights statute, and therefore was not subject to its enforcement
provisions. 7 Justice Miller noted that the definition of "place of public accommodations" was much broader under the state act than under
the federal act; l0 ' that the state act provided its provisions were to be
liberally construed;0 9 that a volunteer fire department had previously
been determined by the Supreme Court of Appeals to be a "place of

102.
103.
104.
105.

388 S.E.2d 480 (W. Va. 1989).
Id. at 482.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 485.

106. Id.
107. Israel, 388 S.E.2d at 488.
108. Id. at 488 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a).

109. Id.
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public accommodations;""' and that other courts had found similar
enterprises, including a youth baseball organization, to be places of
public accommodations."' Justice Miller concluded that interscholastic
athletics have a direct impact on the public school system, generating
public interest, support, and attendance, sufficient to meet the definition
of a "place of public accommodations." '
In Jefferson County Board of Education v. Jefferson County Education Association,113 striking teachers urged abrogation of the common law prohibition against strikes by public employees, following
issuance of an injunction directing a them to return to work. Although
this prohibition was firmly established in common law decisions of
numerous state and federal courts, the teachers relied on County Sanitation District No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Association,
Local No. 660,1" where the California Supreme Court had abrogated
the common law rule and adopted a qualified right to strike for nonessential public employees."' Justice Miller, however, rejected the reasoning in County Sanitation District No. 2 because, unlike California,
West Virginia had no statutory scheme granting public employees collective bargaining rights.'
Recognizing the difficulty in implementing a right to strike where no structure existed for collective bargaining
or the resolution of labor disputes, Justice Miller believed that abrogation of the common law rule "would create chaos."'" Moreover, Justice Miller found that granting a corresponding right of government to
discharge its striking employees, as discussed in County Sanitation
District No. 2, was not very realistic, in light of the difficulty in finding qualified replacement workers. Finally, Justice Miller noted that
even in states that recognized a limited right of public employees to

110. Id. at 489 (citing Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dep't v. West Virginia Human
Rights Comm'n, 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983)).
111. Id. (citing National Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33,
aff'd mem., 338 A.2d 198 (N.J. 1974)) (other citations omitted).
112. Israel, 388 S.E.2d at 489.
113. 393 S.E.2d 653 (W. Va. 1990).
114. 699 P.2d 835 (Cal.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995 (1985).
115. Jefferson County, 393 S.E.2d at 653.
116. Id. at 657.
117. Id. at 658.
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strike, such right was inextricably intertwined with the existence of a
collective bargaining agreement."' 8
The reasoning in Jefferson County Board of Education was not a
departure from previous opinions authored by Justice Miller. To the
contrary, the decision reaffirmed his consistently pragmatic approach to
the gradual evolution of the common law. Justice Miller observed that:
Although in the past we have not hesitated to alter common law rules
where we believed that the changing conditions of society required such a
result, in each case, those changes involved rules that were relatively simple in their impact and fell within an accustomed band of court-created
common law, such as tort law. 9
Conversely, the issue presented in Jefferson County Board of Education, Justice Miller stated, had historically "been the exclusive subject
of legislation not only because of the complexity of the problem, but
also because of its direct impact on the public treasury. 12
In Whiting v. Whiting," the principles of equitable distribution,
first enunciated in LaRue, 2 and eventually codified by the legislature, were further refined. In addition to carefully tracing the steps for
effectuating an equitable distribution of marital assets, the decision
addressed the issue of the effect of using separate property, most commonly acquired prior to the marriage, to purchase jointly-titled property
after the marriage. In Whiting, the husband had a separate interest in
property prior to the marriage, but later had title to the property placed
in the names of both parties as joint tenants."z Justice Miller noted
that several jurisdictions had held "that the transfer of separately owned
property into joint ownership changes the character of the ownership
interest in the property so transferred from nonmarital to marital so
that the property is subject to equitable distribution." '2 4 Moreover, he
observed that this rule "is in accord with the partnership concept of

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. at 659 (footnote omitted).
Jefferson County, 393 S.E.2d at 659.
396 S.E.2d 413 (W. Va. 1990).
LaRue, 304 S.E.2d at 302.
Whiting, 396 S.E.2d at 415.
Id. at 419 (citations omitted).
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marriage which is the basis for equitable distribution."'" Accordingly,
Justice Miller concluded:
[Where, during the course of the marriage, one spouse transfers title to
his or her separate property into the joint names of both spouses, a presumption that the transferring spouse intended to make a gift of the property to the marital estate is consistent with the principles underlying our
equitable distribution statute.""
Development of the Whiting marital gift presumption was logical and
well-reasoned. It enhances predictability, promotes uniformity, facilitates resolution of factual conflict, and encourages settlement, all of
which are characteristic of an opinion authored by Justice Miller.
Preserving the integrity of the West Virginia criminal justice system was presented in In re Investigation of the West Virginia State
Police Crime Laboratory.27 The opinion was prepared by Justice

125. Id. (footnote omitted).
126. Id. at 421.
127. 438 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1993). In addition to this case, Justice Miller authored a
number of the most significant West Virginia opinions in the criminal law area in the past
two decades. See, e.g., Frail v. $24,900.00, 453 S.E.2d 307 (W. Va. 1994) (imposing
procedural due process protections in contraband forfeiture cases); State v. George W. H.,
439 S.E.2d 423 (W. Va. 1993) (declaring no double jeopardy violation for convictions of
incest and sexual abuse by guardian arising from same acts); State v. Gill, 416 S.E.2d 253
(W. Va. 1992) (declaring no double jeopardy violation for convictions of sexual abuse and
sexual abuse by guardian arising from same acts); State v. Collins, 409 S.E.2d 181 (W. Va.
1990) (ruling that police statement made under oath, but not under penalty of perjury,
should have been excluded as substantive evidence); State v. Fortner, 387 S.E.2d 812 (W.
Va. 1989) (articulating principle of concerted action in criminal prosecutions); State v.
Weaver, 382 S.E.2d 327 (W. Va. 1989) (determining that large quantities of alcoholic
beverages given to small child could constitute "poision or other destructive thing" under
criminal statute); Myers v. Frazier, 319 S.E.2d 782 (W. Va. 1984) (recognizing discretion of
circuit courts inaccepting or rejecting plea agreements); State v. Bonham, 317 S.E.2d 501
(W. Va. 1984) (declaring unconstitutional the imposition of a greater sentence on appeal
from a magistrate court conviction); State ex rel. Atkinson v. Wilson, 332 S.E.2d 807 (W.
Va. 1984) (holding that murder statute did not authorize prosecution for death of viable
unborn child); State v. Goff, 289 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that confession
inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief due to Miranda violation may be admitted for
impeachment purposes when defendant testifies); State v. Persinger, 286 S.E.2d 261 (W. Va.
1982) (holding that violation of prompt presentment statute might invalidate confession);
State v. Mitter, 285 S.E.2d 376 (W. Va. 1981) (reversing conviction where expert testified
regarding whether defendant's acts were committed for sexual gratification); State v.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol97/iss3/4

22

Ramey: A Tribute to Justice Thomas B. Miller

1995]

A TRIBUTE TO JUSTICEMILLER

Miller and filed less than one week after receipt of a report by a special judge appointed by the Supreme Court of Appeals to supervise an
investigation into allegations of misconduct by a former state police
serologist.128 The report, which followed a five-month investigation,
contained shocking information regarding a long history of the misrepresentation and fabrication of evidence by the serologist, including
overstating the strength of results of scientific testing of forensic evidence, overstating the frequency of genetic matches, misreporting the
number of pieces of evidence tested, misreporting inconclusive results
as conclusive, altering and misrepresenting laboratory records, failing to
report conflicting scientific results, failing to conduct additional testing
to explain conflicting results, implying a match with a suspect when
testing supported only a match with the victim, and reporting scientifically impossible or improbable results. 2 9 In addition to this individual
misconduct, the report summarized the findings of two police
serologists, selected by the American Society of Crime Laboratory
Directors, and appointed by the special judge, that strongly criticized
procedural deficiencies in the state police crime laboratory, including

Scotchel, 285 S.E.2d 384 (W. Va. 1981) (holding that matters intrinsic to jury deliberations
could not be used to impeach verdict); Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 205 (W. Va.
1981) (invalidating recidivist sentence based on nonviolent offenses as violative of
proportionality principles); State v. Clawson, 270 S.E.2d 659 (W. Va. 1980) (reversing
conviction where autopsy photographs of decomposed victims were introduced); State ex. rel.
Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 1980) (recognizing right of public
access to criminal proceedings); State v. Atkins, 261 S.E.2d 55 (W. Va. 1979) (refusing to
abolish right to retain private prosecutor to assist public prosecutor); State v. Brewster, 261
S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1979) (reversing conviction where defendant was physically restrained
during trial without sufficient evidentiary record); State v. Milam, 260 S.E.2d 295 (W. Va.
1979) (holding that failure of prosecution to meet its burden of proving sanity barred
retrial); Martin v. Leverette, 244 S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1978) (declaring unconstitutional the
failure to award credit for time served in jail on an indeterminate sentence where underlying
offense is bailable); State v. Kirtley, 252 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1978) (holding that prosecution bears ultimate burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not
act in self-defense); State v. Starkey, 244 S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. 1978) (holding that malice
may be inferred from the unjustified use of a firearm); Rhodes v. Leverette, 239 S.E.2d 136
(W. Va. 1977) (holding that an indigent criminal defendant's right to petition for appeal
includes the right to be provided a transcript of the proceedings); State v. McAboy, 236
S.E.2d 431 (W. Va. 1977) (prohibiting, with certain exceptions, the impeachment of criminal
defendants with evidence of prior convictions).
128. Investigation of the West Virginia State Police, 438 S.E.2d at 502-03.
129. Id. at 503.
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the absence of written testing procedures, the lack of internal or external auditing procedures, the absence of proficiency testing, the failure
to follow generally-accepted
scientific testing standards, and inadequate
13
record keeping. 1
Justice Miller concurred with the conclusion of the special judge
that the serologist's "pattern and practice of misconduct completely
undermined the validity and reliability of any forensic work he performed or reported, and thus constitutes newly discovered evidence.' 3 1 In addition to rules governing newly discovered evidence,
however, Justice Miller further noted that the United States Supreme
Court had held that a conviction based on false evidence constitutes a
violation of the defendant's right to procedural due process.' Finally, Justice Miller concluded that the appropriate question in any subsequent post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding was the likely impact
of the tainted evidence on the guilty verdict, specifically the test for
evidentiary error contained in State v. Adkins. 133
In very strong language, Justice Miller expressed his sense of
outrage at the revelations regarding misconduct by the serologist and
the shoddy practices at the crime laboratory, stating "[t]he matters
brought before this Court . . . are shocking and represent egregious
violations of the right of a defendant to a fair trial. They stain our
judicial system and mock the ideal of justice under law."' 34 Accordingly, in a comprehensive and decisive manner, Justice Miller directed
immediate implementation of the recommendations of the special judge,
including distribution of a special post-conviction habeas corpus form
to all prisoners who might desire to seek relief due to the involvement

130. Id. at 504.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 504-05 (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.

150,

154 (1972)

(prosecution responsible for false testimony of witness even if prosecutor unaware of falsity);
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (conviction overturned where stains identified as blood
later determined to be paint); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (conviction
obtained through the use of false evidence constitutes due process violation)).
133. Investigation of the West Virginia State Police, 438 S.E.2d at 506 (citing State v.
Atkins, 261 S.E.2d 55, Syl. Pt. 2 ff. Va. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980)).
134. Id. at 508.
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3
Finally, Justice Miller directed that
of the discredited serologist."'
copies- of the investigative file be provided to the appropriate authorities to determine whether criminal charges against the serologist were
warranted, stating that "[t]his conduct should not go unpunished."' 36

Constitutional limitations on public financing were involved in
Winkler v. State School Building Authority. 7 Specifically, the question in Winkler was whether bonds issued by the state school building
authority violated state constitutional provisions imposing debt limitations on state government.3 8 Proponents argued that disclaimers on
the bonds which provided the legislature was not legally obligated to
appropriate funds to pay debt service avoided exposure of general
revenue and, accordingly, the scheme was constitutional.3 9 Their opponents, however, argued that despite these disclaimers, general revenue was implicated, rendering the scheme unconstitutional. 4
In an opinion filed only two days following oral argument, Justice
Miller began his analysis by noting that, pursuant to W. VA. CONST.
art. XIV, § 2, the school building funding plan could have been submitted to the voters for approval in the form of a constitutional amendment.'4 ' Next, he observed that although occasionally cited in tandem,
the two state constitutional provisions at issue, W. VA. CONST. art. X,
§§ 4 and 6, serve different purposes, and that only W. VA. CONST. art.
X, § 4, which provides, in pertinent part, that, "[n]o debt shall be
contracted by this State, except to meet casual deficits in the revenue,
to redeem a previous liability of the State, to suppress insurrection,
repel invasion or defend the State in time of war . . ,"142 was implicated. Justice Miller further engaged in a thorough discussion 43 of
prior decisions involving the creation of state agencies,' the payment

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 507.
Id. at 508.
434 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1993).
Id. at 423.
Id. at 424-25.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 426-27.
Winkler, 434 S.E.2d at 423.
Id. at 428-29.
State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 58 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1950), rev'd on other grounds,
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of rent,145 the creation of a pension system,14 lease-financing of
government buildings,147 the construction of a power generating facility,148 the issuance of industrial and commercial revenue bonds,149
and the issuance of bonds liquidated from a special fund."' Synthesizing these cases, Justice Miller concluded that W. VA. CONST. art. X,
§ 4 was not designed to prohibit the State "from issuing revenue bonds
that are payable from contracts that require rental payments of another
state agency or require other necessary recurring contractual expenses
such as utilities; nor does this constitutional provision preclude the
issuance of revenue bonds which are to be redeemed from a special
fiind."' 51
In support of the school building funding plan, proponents relied
upon language in State ex rel. West Virginia Resource Recovery-Solid
Waste Disposal Authority v. Gill,152 that indicated that bonds dependent upon future legislative appropriations might be permissible so long
as successive legislatures are not obligated to make such appropriations. 5 Justice Miller, however, dismissed this argument, noting that
the interpretation urged by the proponents was logical only if "divorced
from the facts in that case." ' 4 Moreover, he observed that, if read as
narrowly as urged by the proponents, the Gill case would render the
constitutional limitation "meaningless."' ' Obviously perturbed at what
he perceived as an argument possibly not advanced in good faith, Justice Miller stated, "[ilt is difficult for us to understand how the Gill
case, under its facts, could be construed to authorize a radical change

341 U.S. 22 (1951).
145. State ex rel. Hall v. Taylor, 178 S.E.2d 48 (W. Va. 1971).
146. State ex rel. Bd. of Governors v. Sims, 55 S.E.2d 505 (W7.Va. 1954).
147. State ex rel. State Bldg. Comm'n v. Moore, 184 S.E.2d 94 (W. Va. 1971).
148. State ex rel. West Virginia Resource Recovery-Solid Waste Disposal Auth. v. Gill,
323 S.E.2d 590 (W. Va. 1984).
149. State ex rel. Ohio County Conum'n v. Samol, 275 S.E.2d 2 (W. Va. 1980); State
ex reL County Court of Marion County v. Demus, 135 S.E.2d 352 (W.Va. 1964).
150. State ex rel. Hall v. Taylor, 178 S.E.2d 48 (W. Va. 1971).
151. Winkler, 434 S.E.2d at 430.
152. Gill, 323 S.E.2d at 590.
153. Winkler, 434 $.E.2d at 430-31.
154. Id. at 431.
155. Id.
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from our earlier bond cases," 156 and, "[w]hile we may admire the le'
gal sophistry of this argument, it defies our practical judgment."157
Justice Miller acknowledged that the weight of authority in other
jurisdictions appeared to support the position of the proponents. In
Dykes v. Northern Virginia Transportation District Commission,"' the
Virginia Supreme Court, after initially deciding that disclaimers notwithstanding, the practical effect of a bond scheme was to impose a
long term obligation on general revenue, reversed itself on rehearing
and held that the scheme did not impose a legally enforceable obligation on the governmental entity. 159 Similarly, Miller noted that in
Steup v. Indiana Housing Finance Authority,16 the Indiana Supreme
Court upheld a bonding statute that contained language which expressly
provided that there was no obligation on the part of the legislature to
fund the liquidation of the bonds.' On the other hand, in State ex
reL Ohio Funds Management Board v. Walker, 62 Miller noted that
the Supreme Court of Ohio invalidated a plan to issue revenue anticipation notes that contained a disclaimer similarly designed to avoid
constitutional debt limitations. 163 Following his analysis of decisions
in other jurisdictions, Justice Miller concluded:
We simply cannot agree with the rationale of the Virginia and Indiana
courts as we find it to chimerical. Obviously, where the only source of

funds for revenue bonds is general appropriations, it defies logic to say
that the Legislature has no obligation to fund such bonds. These courts are

willing to ignore the practical reality that will be visited upon a state's
credit if there is a default on the bonds. What these courts have done is

156. Id. Additionally, in a footnote to this statement, Justice Miller remarked, "If Gill
augured such a radical constitutional departure from our revenue bond law, one wonders
why the test case was needed three years later in State ex rel. Department of Employment
Securityv. Manchin, 361 S.E.2d 474 (W. Va. 1987). There, we approved revenue bonds that
were to be liquidated from a special tax on employers and wage earners." Winkler, 434
S.E.2d at 431 n.21.
157. Winkler, 434 S.E.2d at 432.
158. 411 S.E.2d I (Va. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2275 (1992).
159. Winkler, 434 S.E.2d at 432.
160. 402 N.E.2d 1215 (Ind. 1980).
161. Winkler, 434 S.E.2d at 433.
162. 561 N.E.2d 927 (Ohio 1990).
163. Winkler, 434 S.E.2d at 434-35.
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to ignore
the plain language and practical effect of the bond legisla16 4
tion.

Accordingly, although concluding that the ruling should not be retroactively applied to invalidate bonds previously issued, which Justice Miller acknowledged "would bring considerable financial chaos to the
State,"' 65 the revenue bonds authorized under the school building authority statute were declared unconstitutional.166
The life of an appellate judge is, in many ways, a solitary life.
Ethical considerations inhibit interaction with lawyers who might appear before the appellate court. The relationship between appellate and
trial judges, granting the ability of one to overturn the decisions of the
other, can be rather awkward. Justice Miller was, however, well-suited
to the work of an appellate judge. Scholarly, intelligent, compassionate,
fair-minded, even-tempered, modest, self-deprecating, and industrious
are all adjectives that describe him. "The time is out of joint," might
1' 67
rue Hamlet, "0 cursed spite, that ever I was born to set it right,'
but Justice Miller was always true to his principles, perhaps quietly
resigned to his fate to valiantly search for the answer in every case to
the question, "[i]s it a fair result?" 1 To his colleagues, Justice Miller
was a compass in occasionally dark and stormy seas, never avoiding a
difficult decision, never failing to offer guidance, never resorting to
harsh rhetoric or personal attack, never losing sight of the reasons he
sought judicial office. We can honor him in no greater measure than in
manner which he honored us with his wisdom, his perserverence, and
his invaluable contribution to the evolution of our law.

164. Id. at 433.
165. Id. at 436.
166. Id.
SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 5.
168. Martz, supra note 5, at IB, col. I (quoting Justice Miller's expression of his
simple approach to judicial decision-making).

167. W=LLAM
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A POSTSCRIPT BY THE HONORABLE THOMAS E. McHUGH,
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

Justice Thomas B. Miller will always be recognized as one of the
premier jurists in the history of our State. It was my honor to have
been a colleague of his on the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia from January, 1981, through his retirement in August, 1994.
During that time, I observed his intellect, humor, integrity, and unwavering devotion to his judicial duties. The tribute prepared by Ancil G.
Ramey, Clerk of the Court, is the most complete compilation of the
opinions of any justice. It reflects the unsurpassed contributions by
Justice Miller to the jurisprudence of West Virginia. Upon the retirement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes from the United States Supreme Court, he sent a note to Justice Louis D. Brandeis. The note
stated, in part: "The long and intimate association with men who so
command my respect and admiration could not but fix my affection as
well." Those words reflect my association with Justice Thomas B.
Miller.
A POSTSCRIPT BY THE HONORABLE MARGARET L. WORKMAN,
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

It was my honor and privilege to serve with Justice Thomas B.
Miller on the State Supreme Court for almost six years. I did not
know him well before I joined the court, but we both shared the rather
intensive experience of running for court in the hard-fought 1988 election campaign. The better I came to know him, the more I liked and
admired him.
I came on the court after that difficult campaign as the youngest
member and the first woman ever elected. I did not know what atmosphere I would encounter. I found an amazing spirit of collegiality and
mutual respect among all the members of the court, and tremedous
personal encouragement and support from Justice Miller. When I had
the opportunity to move the law into a new or innovative direction in
my special areas of interest, and when I proposed the initiation of
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special administrative projects relating to women and children's interests, it was Justice Miller whose encouragement and support was always there.
Ancil Ramey's Article only highlights the immense contributions
Justice Miller has made to the development of the law. He came to the
judiciary at a most propitious time for West Virginia. Society was
changing dramatically and new issues of law were emerging. He was
instrumental in flinging back the curtains to let the sun shine in as the
Supreme Court began to accept and resolve more contemporary and
unique legal issues.
On a personal note, perhaps the most pleasurable aspect of working with Justice Miller on a day-to-day basis was his wonderful sense
of humor. His dry wit and amazing ability to inject humor when it
was most sorely needed sustained all who worked with him.
Whatever time I may spend in the judiciary, it will always be
Thomas B. Miller who will personify my ideal of what a judge should
be. His immense intellect, integrity, creativity, and compassion have
created a lasting legacy.
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